Description
Extralegal Governance offers a groundbreaking analysis of how illegal markets in China sustain themselves through complex social institutions and informal governance systems. Rather than descending into chaos, these underground economies develop their own rules, enforcement mechanisms, and organizational structures that facilitate trade and maintain order among participants.
Peng Wang and Wanlin Lin draw on extensive empirical research to demonstrate how criminal networks, black markets, and unlicensed businesses create alternative institutional frameworks that rival formal state governance in their sophistication. The authors explore case studies across various illicit sectors, revealing the economic logic and social dynamics that enable these markets to thrive despite legal prohibition.
This work contributes significantly to understanding informal institutions, economic anthropology, and the limits of state control. It challenges conventional assumptions about the relationship between legality and social order, offering valuable insights for economists, sociologists, and policymakers studying governance, institutional economics, and China’s complex economic landscape.
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