Description
Disagreement examines one of the most pressing issues in contemporary epistemology: what should we do when we disagree with epistemic peers—people who are equally informed, intelligent, and thoughtful? This Element provides a comprehensive overview of the major positions in disagreement theory, including conciliatory views that recommend revising our beliefs and steadfast views that permit maintaining our original positions.
Machuca analyzes the philosophical foundations of disagreement, exploring how it relates to justification, knowledge, and rational belief formation. The book addresses key debates such as whether peer disagreement constitutes a defeater for one’s beliefs and how we should weigh our own judgment against that of others. It also considers practical implications for science, politics, and everyday reasoning.
By carefully examining arguments from both conciliatory and steadfast perspectives, Machuca provides readers with essential tools for understanding disagreement’s role in epistemology and its significance for rational inquiry.
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